Diana Eck illustrated in “A New Religious America,” our need to expand our perspective of religion and religious life in the attempt to create a more inclusive society. Specifically, in chapter six Eck states that we need to move beyond first impressions and sight when she explains that “visible difference is the issue” (297). The first thing we seem to notice is sight and through sight difference and strangeness becomes readily apparent. It seems that our prejudgments come out when we see someone that looks different from the norm and that is always problematic.

Eck continues the chapter by illustrating how laws have been passed in the attempt to squash these prejudgments and discriminations that ensues from visible and religious difference. For instance, Eck notes that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits religious discrimination. However, the vague definition and the loose interpretation of the law causes hiccups in the process to gain religious equality. Eck indicates that “but just what constitutes ‘reasonable accommodations’ and ‘undue hardship’ is the thorny issue as each [court] case comes forward” (317). I feel that there is a need to have consistent and cohesive decisions when the language is extremely vague and requires constant interpretation. For instance, Eck explains how the courts rejected the claim that a Native American’s daughter obtain an alternative to the traditional social security number because it was felt that “to assign a number to his daughter would ‘rob her of her spirit.’” While that is very refreshing to hear and realistically few people are overjoyed to be assigned a number in place of their individuality, pragmatically it would be impractical for the government to allow this to take place. It seems like a sticky situation because both arguments are persuasive which makes it is hard to interpret and determine what is just and what is religious discrimination.

However, there were some cases that Eck portrayed that both shocked and appalled me as it essentially revealed the extreme ignorance of some people. This is especially evident when Eck repeats the dialogue of a worker at a domino’s pizza restaurant who states, “‘unless you take that stupid thing [head scarf] off you have to leave” (317). This illustrates that there is sometimes a lack of understanding of another religion and religious practice, especially in the workplace. Although there is individual responsibility of understating and education regarding religion, I think that it also has to be the responsibility of the employer to instill some kind of religious appreciation. Both employees and employers need to be held accountable. Ultimately, this example shows how there is a dire need for education on religion.

Throughout chapter six, Eck convincingly painted many pictures and incidents that reaffirmed our need for understanding regarding other religions. However, I disagreed with Eck’s comparison between religious discrimination and racial discrimination. Eck stated that “looking different comes with a price, as America’s Amish and Hutterites can testify and as people of racial minorities in the U.S. have experienced” (299). Although I definitely agree that religious discrimination is unjust and unnecessary, the choice to wear a headscarf (as was Eck’s example of religious discrimination) can be removed and therefore, it is to some small degree, a choice. Whereas race and skin color is not a choice because it cannot be changed or taken off to alleviate prejudice or discrimination. Therefore, while I see Eck’s point that religious discrimination is prevalent and harmful in society I disagreed with her analogy to race. I also found myself asking more question and wanting more explanation during this chapter. For instance, Eck states that “local media responded supportively with outrage, but the tragedy was ignored by state and national media” (312). I wanted to know why religious persecution or discrimination does not receive national media attention?

Overall, I found Eck’s writing to be extremely informative and I agreed with her solution that we need to stop being strangers and begin to see each other as neighbors and friends. This means taking the time to learn and understand religious differences instead of just pegging them as abnormal or strange. Eck concludes by stating that “time and again, stories that begin with incidents of hatred and conflict evolve in time into stories of new neighbors who have, in the course of their conflict, learned much more about one another. Distant images have become people with faces, voices and problems...and neighbors, even those who differ from us, become allies in creating our common society” (332). It seems that once we get to know and understand a person on an individual level, the lack of understanding and prejudicial ignorance flakes off. It made me understand why Eck notes that “the most religiously motivated hate crimes are directed at property rather than people” (301). It shows that individuals resist what they do not understand and what they think religion symbolizes. Instead of putting a face to Islam or Buddhism or Christianity they pull from the abstract and create misinformation that makes “other religions” seem dangerous and unwanted.

Karen Armstrong also reiterated the need for appreciation and reeducation of religion in her speech regarding the Charter for Compassion. What I found most intriguing and enlightening was the fact that Armstrong vehemently pushed the need to display compassion. She noted the benefits of having compassion is that “we dethrone ourselves from the center of our world and we put another person there.” I felt that this quote was important because it is such a simple ideal yet it seems the hardest to achieve. Instead of compassion some interpret the holy texts so that they are only applicable to them and only benefit them. Some people mold and form religion so it fits in their world and meshes with their beliefs. All texts and laws can be to a certain extent twisted and interpreted in order to benefit someone or something. I believed she referred to this as “religious illiteracy.” Ultimately, Armstrong advocated a reclamation of religion as a tool for compassion and empathy and I thought she illustrated a refreshing illustration of the potential of religion

Research Project Proposal

I am interested in finding out the details of the situation regarding the protesting monks in Burma. I heard about the incident (Buddhist monks protesting the government in Burma) briefly in September, but I haven’t really pursued any details regarding the why. I would like to know the background that led up to this point. I would also like to find out about the current situation and its impact on the United States (if any). I am interested in the relationship between this religious group and their outspoken response to their government and think that it would be a good topic for me to explore.

White Theology

In Mo’s presentation handout last Tuesday she observed in James W. Perkison’s article, “White Theology: Outing Supremacy in Modernity,” that the white/male normative gaze still exists today. She states that “our social structure and media have this gaze as the base for women’s approval level, that women must conform to and be a product of desire for white men.” I definitely agree that beauty is defined from the gaze of the white male. For instance, women tend to discipline the body in order to conform to this ideal image through corsets, bras, heels, etc. Furthermore, in terms of race and ethnicity, we see European beauty as the norm while other races’ beauty is categorized as “exotic” and “unusual.” This beauty ideal and this white normative gaze clearly illustrates white supremacy and how this dominant culture elicits self-defined superiority. For instance, in “The American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World,” David E. Stannard states that the idea that Native Americans were actually human was constantly questioned because “if they were men, they were ‘men without God, without Law, without breeches’” (229). I thought it was extremely funny that their lack of clothes presumes that they are savages. But however illogical, it was not surprising to me. This fact that I was not shocked or surprised by the article's illustrations is in actuality extremely sad. Essentially, this line of thinking illustrates how Europeans did not and (for the most part) could not, put themselves in the shoes of Native Americans. Instead, there was a presumption and deep rooted belief that their culture was superior to all other cultures. This is true even today. We call certain types of customs archaic and villages without electricity are deemed primitive. We cannot see the benefits of having these different customs because it is ingrained in our minds that our way is the most effective way. I go back to Ishmael again when he states that, “each Leaver people has a system that works well for them because it…was suited to the terrain in which they lived, suited to the climate in which they lived, suited to the biological community…suited to their own particular tastes, preferences, and visions of the world” (206). Ishmael calls this “wisdom.” However, it is this wisdom that our dominant culture lacks because we insist that our way of living is the best way regardless of climate, biology, taste, etc. It illustrates how the United States’ culture is deeply ingrained with white privilege because we believe that we have the right to control and criticize the activities of other cultures and customs. Who’s to say our customs are superior or even correct? It is because of the white male normative gaze.

James W. Perkison continues his argument of white theology and white privilege by stating that “white self-confession requires more than mere self-naming or ‘me- too-ism.’ It demands clear steps of conversion away from the historical intentions of material privileges of white self-interest” (226). When individuals come to the realization that they are beneficially impacted by white privilege it is a profound discovery. However, Perkison notes that dismantling white privilege goes beyond just admitting that the privilege exists. The hardest part is consciously taking steps to strip some of that privilege from a person’s life. Perkison examines this white privilege through gated community living. He notes that “for some, refusal to live ‘middle class’ in lifestyle and ‘gated’ in a place is a deep choice of spiritual formation and a first step toward social solidarity with the marginalized” (228). This seemingly simple choice actually has powerful connotations. Living in a gated community assumes that a safer environment can be created with a certain level of wealth and money. It also presumes that a gated community is in fact safer than a street without a gate. Furthermore, instead of taking action to change and uplift a community or area, a gated community encourages that money can buy safety and other non material things.

Perkison also asserts throughout this article that everyone benefits either indirectly or directly from this privilege and it takes individual and collective responsibility to join the struggle. The “tongue” or the voice cannot alone solve any solutions. Instead, it is “complex rhythm—in concert with other bodies similarly working anguish into eloquence—is the longest-standing human antidote for such inchoate eruptions” (232). It requires that we no longer look through the white/male gaze and value the white male body as the norm in our culture. It requires a complete reformation of our cultural assumptions. For instance, in our society today most, including myself, still struggle with identifying what is white culture and identifying my white privilege when it takes on the most minuscule forms in my life and in the life of others. Furthermore, this white gaze relates directly to our society’s preference and use of labels for categorization. Labels are used to classify people on a scale where white actions and white culture is normative. Certain types of speech and certain types of dress are valued over others as a way to illustrate covertly that white culture is at “the apex of the great chain of being” (71). Perkison states that “confronting white supremacy in oneself, sooner of later, means exploring the possibility of learning to speak in more than just one voice, to express more than just one rhythm, to reiterate more than just one culture” (238). Ultimately, I take this to mean that even if we use labels as a way of identification, we need to escape from this antiquated idea of assigning value to certain labels.

Perkison concludes his article by briefing touching on the issue of baptism and religion in the context of white supremacy. He explains that instead of experiencing a “momentary, a brief ‘wetting’” of this enlightenment we need a baptismal reprogramming where an individual is enlightened and “able to see and feel the significance of the entire system of supremacy” which would inevitably involve “a disinterring of the theological structure of whiteness as a mode of identity” (245). In these brief last two or three pages Perkison makes a very strong case in which he unveils the negative aspect of religion in the dominant culture. I feel that most hide under the façade of enlightenment that comes with baptism and religion. They realize that discrimination and this “othering” is unnecessary and unwarranted. However, just as recognition of the problem is not enough, neither is a brief water drop of enlightenment. Instead, there needs to be an inclusive look at white supremacy and how it manifests in most religious structures. For instance, at the most obvious level, how is it that today, women are not allowed to be in the high positions of the Catholic Church? How come some religions are segregated by race and gays are condemned for their lifestyle? These questions and more need to be examined and scrutinized in order to see that small silvers of enlightenment does not dismantle this “theological structure of whiteness” that is so prevalent in the dominant religions and in dominant society today.